We measure the strategic complexity of a situation by how long people think on average when they face that situation (where we categorize situations according to the characteristics of play in the previous round). We find that strategic complexity varies significantly across situations, and we find considerable heterogeneity in how responsive subjects' thinking times are to complexity. We also study how variation in response times at the individual level affects strategic behavior and success. 'Overthinking' is detrimental: when a subject thinks for longer than she would normally do in a particular strategic situation, she wins less frequently and earns less.
Introduction
Psychologists have long been interested in choice response or decision times (e.g., Stone, 1960) . Recently economists have become interested in how the speed of decision making affects behavior and outcomes. Response times are thought to be connected to decision-making style: fast thinking is linked to intuitive or instinctive decision making, while slower thinking is linked to a more deliberate or contemplative mode of thought (e.g., Rubinstein, 2016) . 1 Following the psychology literature, one stream of research in economics looks at response times in non-strategic environments: see Spiliopoulos and Ortmann (2016) 's comprehensive survey. 2 In contrast to the literature that studies response times in non-strategic settings, our focus is on response times in strategic settings. Speed of decision making is of particular importance in strategic settings because of the complexity of the environment: players need to think about the payoff structure and then form beliefs about how others will behave. For a sophisticated agent, forming such beliefs involves complex iterative thinking. The type of reasoning required to perform well in games requires substantial cognitive effort, but standard theory is silent about how much cognitive effort people exert in strategic settings. 3 In reality, agents vary in their willingness to exert cognitive effort and in how useful cognitive effort is for their performance in strategic settings. According to Rubinstein (2007) , response time is a simple low-cost indicator of the process of reasoning in strategic games, with more 'cognitive' choices taking longer than 'instinctive' ones. The speed of decision making in strategic environments has received some recent interest. Experiments have considered how response times relate to: the type of game being played; rates of cooperation in public goods games; behavior in contests; strategies designed to persuade; threshold strategies in global games; and private information in auctions and environments with social learning. 1 As noted by Rubinstein (2016) , this distinction between instinctive and contemplative decision making is in some sense consistent with Kahneman (2011) 's distinction between 'system I' and 'system II' decision processes, although economists generally study response times measured in seconds while psychologists generally study response times measured in fractions of seconds.
2 Wilcox (1993) finds that lottery choice response times respond positively to incentives. Chabris et al. (2009) find that response times increase with the similarity in expected values of binary choices. Piovesan and Wengström (2009) and Lohse et al. (2014) find that generosity is associated with longer response times (both across and within-individuals). Achtziger and Alós-Ferrer (2013) link response times to Bayesian updating. Clithero and Rangel (2013) use response times together with choice data to predict choice out of sample. Rubinstein (2013) finds that shorter response times are associated with more mistakes but not with the incidence of behavior inconsistent with standard models of decision making. In a single-agent forecasting task, Moritz et al. (2014) find that very fast or very slow decisions compared to the prediction from a learning model with individual-level heterogeneity perform worse. Hutcherson et al. (2015) , Cappelen et al. (2016) , Chen and Fischbacher (2016) and Konovalov and Krajbich (2016) show that response times are associated with risk, time and social preferences. Caplin and Martin (2016) find that quick automatic decisions are of lower quality.
3 A small literature in behavioral economics addresses this issue: see, e.g., Alaoui and Penta (2016b) who present a cost-benefit analysis of the endogenous depth of reasoning in games. Alaoui and Penta (2016a) extend the model, and Alaoui and Penta (2016c) apply the extended model to Avoyan and Schotter (2016) 's data on the allocation of time across games.
4 Kuo et al. (2009) and Polonio et al. (2015) find faster response times in coordination games than in dominancesolvable games, while Di Guida and Devetag (2013) find shorter response times in games with focal points and Rand et al. (2015) find that response times vary according to whether decisions are implemented with error and intentions are observable. Gneezy et al. (2010) find that response times in the Race Game are longer in losing positions. Arad and Rubinstein (2012) study the relationship between response times and behavior in the Colonel Blotto contest. Glazer and Rubinstein (2012) study the association between response times and behavioral types in a game of persuasion. Rand et al. (2012) , Lotito et al. (2013) and Nielsen et al. (2014) find that shorter response times are associated with more cooperation in public goods games, although Evans et al. (2015) find a U-shaped relationship, Krajbich et al. (2015) argue that the direction of the correlation is not robust to changing the relative attractiveness of the selfish and cooperative actions, Recalde et al. (2015) argue that the relationship may reflect mistakes and Nishi et al. (2017) find cross-cultural differences. Schotter and Trevino (2014) look at the relationship between response times and threshold strategies in a global game. Agranov et al. (2015) elicit incentivized choices at multiple points in time and find that 'sophisticated' players decrease their choice with thinking time in a p-beauty contest variant. Turocy and Cason (2015) consider the relationship between signals and response times in auctions. Frydman and Krajbich (2016) find that in
In particular, we aim to study response times in repeated strategic interactions. Strategic interactions of economic interest are often repeated: examples include repeated rounds of job hiring and searching, markets with repeated price competition, repeated selling of goods via auction and multiple rounds of competition for promotions within firms. We leverage the dynamic nature of response-time data from repeated strategic interactions to: (i) measure the strategic complexity of a situation by how long people think on average when they face that situation (where we categorize situations according to the characteristics of play in the previous round); and (ii) discover whether variation in thinking time across rounds in which an individual faces the same strategic situation affects strategic behavior and success.
To study response times in repeated strategic interactions we use the experimental data collected by us in Gill and Prowse (2016) . 5 In the experiment, 780 student subjects were matched into groups of three players. Each group played the p-beauty contest for ten rounds with feedback and no rematching. In each round, the subject whose chosen number was closest to seventy percent of the average of the three numbers chosen by the group members (i.e., p = 0.7) won six dollars. The subjects had ninety seconds to make their choice in each round. Gill and Prowse (2016) also measured the subjects' cognitive ability and personality.
In the p-beauty contest the incentive to undercut the average of the choices drives the equilibrium to zero. With repetition, choices in beauty contest experiments move toward the equilibrium (e.g., Nagel, 1995 , Ho et al., 1998 , Gill and Prowse, 2016 . However, the game is well-suited to studying strategic thinking: players who expect others to select non-equilibrium actions often have an incentive to choose away from equilibrium themselves. Real-world parallels of the p-beauty contest include timing games in financial and labor markets: during a bubble or in a job market, there is an advantage to trading or making job offers a little earlier than competitors, but moving too early is costly.
A few papers find a positive between-subject relationship between response times and success in strategic games. 6 We replicate this finding for our beauty contest game by showing that subjects who think for longer on average win more rounds and choose numbers closer to equilibrium. We find no statistically significant relationship between cognitive ability or personality and average response times. 7 Our first substantive contribution is to leverage the dynamic nature of repeated-game response times to develop a measure of strategic complexity. In our repeated-game setting with fixed groups, the subjects may perceive that the strategic complexity of the situation that they face varies with the characteristics of play in the previous round. Motivated by this observation, we categorize eleven different situations according to the particular subject's earnings in the previous round, the rank-order of the choices of the three group members in the previous round, and whether the group played the a social learning environment people can learn about others' private information from observing their response time. Nishi et al. (2016) and Nishi et al. (2017) find that in repeated social dilemmas response times correlate with the level of previous group cooperation. Spiliopoulos (2016) studies a repeated 2 × 2 constant-sum game and finds that the winstay-lose-shift heuristic is associated with faster choices. Brañas-Garza et al. (forthcoming) study the response times of ultimatum-game proposers.
5 Gill and Prowse (2016) investigate how cognitive ability and personality influence the evolution of play toward Nash equilibrium. The paper does not study response times.
6 Arad and find that longer response times are associated with winning more battles in the Colonel Blotto game. Brañas-Garza et al. (forthcoming) find that ultimatum-game proposers who think longer earn more. With hypothetical payoffs, Rubinstein (2016) finds that in a 2 × 2 zero-sum game, the more contemplative action (that is, the action associated with more thought on average) yields a higher expected payoff (in non-zero-sum games the relationship between contemplative actions and payoffs is not as clear).
7 We are not aware of any other work that measures the relationship between personality and response times in strategic games. With respect to cognitive ability, in a public goods game Nielsen et al. (2014) find mixed results.
Nash equilibrium in that round. 8 We then measure the strategic complexity of a situation by how long subjects think on average when they face that particular situation. Using average thinking time to measure the strategic complexity of a situation in our repeated-game setting is related to Rubinstein (2016) 's distinction between 'contemplative' and 'instinctive' actions in one-shot games according to how long subjects think on average before choosing the action: according to Rubinstein (2016) , more contemplative actions require more strategic reasoning. Having developed our measure of strategic complexity, we show that strategic complexity varies significantly across situations. We also find considerable between-subject heterogeneity in how responsive subjects' thinking times are to changes in strategic complexity: we estimate a two-type mixture regression model and find that one type of subject varies her response times substantially with the strategic complexity of the situation that she faces, while the other type hardly varies her response times at all.
Our second substantive contribution is to study how within-subject variation in response times across rounds affects behavior and success in a repeated-game strategic setting. Specifically, we often observe the same subject facing the same strategic situation more than once, and we can measure whether thinking for longer or for less long than the subject would normally do in that situation affects the subject's choices and her probability of winning the round. 9,10 We find that thinking more than normal results in worse performance: when a subject thinks for longer than she would normally do in a particular situation, she wins less frequently and earns less. The behavioral mechanism that drives the reduction in performance is a tendency to move away from Nash equilibrium behavior: when the subject thinks for longer than normal she is more likely to increase her choice relative the previous round and she is less likely to choose the equilibrium number. We conclude that 'overthinking' is detrimental to performance in our strategic setting. Interestingly, these results based on withinsubject variation show that overthinking is detrimental even though, as noted above, between-subject variation reveals that subjects who think for longer on average (across situations and rounds) perform better on average. However, this between-subject variation fails to capture the effect of overthinking at the individual level, and the between-subject correlation between average response time and average performance might be driven by the effect of unobserved individual characteristics on both response times and performance.
Together, our findings shed new light on how subjects allocate cognitive resources in games and the consequences of doing so. Our finding that, in repeated games, thinking time varies across situations provides evidence that subjects respond to the characteristics of the situation that they face when deciding how much cognitive effort to allocate to the situation. However, only one type of subject 8 To give a flavor, we define three of the eleven situations here. Situation 1: the subject won in the previous round with the lowest choice, and the two other subjects chose the same higher number. Situation 2: the subject won in the previous round with an 'intermediate' choice (that is, one of the other subjects lost with a lower number and the other lost with a higher number). Situation 3: the subject lost in the previous round with the highest choice, and the other two subjects chose lower numbers different from each other.
9 Recall from the previous paragraph that we categorize situations according to the characteristics of play in the previous round.
10 Some existing papers constrain thinking time (see the survey by Spiliopoulos and Ortmann, 2016) . However, in the context of strategic games, constraining players' thinking time does not give a clean measure of how a player's strategic behavior varies in her own thinking time because a player's behavior could also change in anticipation of the time constraint on the behavior of the other players. Furthermore, under a time constraint experimental subjects are not choosing how long to think and the imposed time constraint is often very short. Most closely related to our competitive strategic setting: (i) with a time limit of just fifteen seconds Kocher and Sutter (2006) find slower convergence to equilibrium in a modified beauty contest; (ii) with a time limit of fifteen seconds to both read the instructions and then decide Lindner and Sutter (2013) find fewer sophisticated choices in the 11-20 game (but also choices closer to the mixed Nash equilibrium); and (iii) in a design where subjects have just twenty seconds to search payoff boxes using their mouse and then decide Spiliopoulos et al. (2015) find that time pressure reduces payoff search and induces simpler heuristics in normal-form games.
responds to strategic complexity, which highlights the importance of taking seriously across-subject heterogeneity. Our finding that overthinking can be detrimental to performance suggests that allocating too many cognitive resources in games can be counterproductive relative to quicker more instinctive thinking.
We hope that our findings will help to refine existing models of boundedly-rational thinking in games and help to build new ones. In the context of the level-k model (Stahl and Wilson, 1995) , our results suggest that the level of strategic reasoning that people use might vary predictably with the particular characteristics of the strategic situation that they face. Furthermore, our findings suggest that new models that incorporate explicitly the choice of how hard to think in strategic interactions could yield better predictive power.
Experimental design
We use the experimental data collected by us in Gill and Prowse (2016) . In total, 780 student subjects participated in our experiment at the University of Arizona's Experimental Science Laboratory. On average subjects earned twenty-five dollars. Online Appendix I provides the experimental instructions.
Subjects played ten rounds of the p-beauty contest game in fixed groups of three without rematching. In every round each group member chose an integer x ∈ {0, 1, ..., 100}. We implemented the beauty contest with p = 0.7: the group member whose chosen number was closest to seventy percent of the mean of the three numbers chosen by the group members was paid six dollars and the other group members received nothing. In the case of ties, the six dollars was split equally among the subjects who tied. The unique Nash equilibrium is for all players to choose zero.
The subjects had ninety seconds to make their choice in each round. If a subject failed to make a choice within ninety seconds, then a flashing request prompted an immediate choice. 11 At the end of the ninety seconds, all groups advanced together to a feedback stage that lasted thirty seconds. We provided feedback about the group members' choices in that round, seventy percent of the mean of the choices, and the earnings of the group members in that round.
We measured subjects' cognitive ability using a Raven test, and subjects were matched into groups of three to play the p-beauty contest according to their Raven test score. We also measured the personality (Big Five, grit and a measure of future orientation) of 270 of our subjects. Gill and Prowse (2016) provide further details, including details of the subject matching by Raven test score. As discussed in footnote 6, a few papers find a positive between-subject relationship between response times and success in strategic games. We replicate this finding. Specifically, we run a between-subject analysis in which we regress measures of success on the subject-level average response time. The first three columns of Table 1 show that a subject's average response time is a predictor of her success: subjects who think for longer on average are more likely to win and earn more. To understand the behavior that underlines these patterns, we regress choices on the subject-level average response time. The last column of Table 1 shows that subjects who think for longer on average choose lower numbers in the beauty contest, i.e., they choose numbers closer to Nash equilibrium. Notes: All averages are taken at the subject level. When calculating the fraction of rounds won, a subject is considered to be a winner if she won all or part of the prize. Log earnings per round is calculated by taking the log of earnings at the round level and then averaging at the subject level over rounds. When taking the log of earnings, we add fifty cents to earnings in each round (the show-up fee of five dollars divided by the number of rounds) to avoid taking the log of zero. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors with clustering at the group level are shown in parentheses. * , * * and * * * denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels (two-sided tests). 
Strategic complexity
We now turn to our first substantive contribution: we use the dynamic nature of the repeated response times in our beauty contest game to measure the strategic complexity of the situations that our subjects face. We proceed in three stages: first, we categorize situations according to the characteristics of play in the previous round; second, we measure the strategic complexity of each situation by how long subjects think on average when they face that situation; and finally, we explore heterogeneity in how subjects respond to changes in strategic complexity.
Categorizing situations
In our repeated-game setting with fixed groups, subjects may perceive that the strategic complexity of the situation that they face in a given round varies with the characteristics of play in the previous round. Motivated by this observation, we categorize situations according to: (i) the subject's earnings in the previous round; (ii) the rank-order of the choices of the three group members in the previous round; and (iii) whether the group played the Nash equilibrium in the previous round. Let n denote the number chosen by the subject in the previous round, and let n o and n o denote the numbers chosen in the previous round by the subject's opponents. Without loss of generality, we order the opponents such that n o ≤ n o . The subject's situation in a given round is determined by: (i) the subject's earnings in the previous round, (ii) the ordering of n, n o and n o ; and (iii) whether all three choices were zero (the Nash equilibrium) in the previous round. We focus on the eleven situations described in the first column of Table 2 . The second column of Table 2 shows that we have between 123 and 1,739 subject-round observations for each situation, giving a total of 7,012 subject-round observations across the eleven situations. 13 We order the situations by strategic complexity: the third column of Table 2 reports our measure of strategic complexity, which we explain in Section 4.2.
Measuring strategic complexity
We measure the strategic complexity of a situation by how long subjects think on average when they face that particular situation. To identify the influence of the situation on average response times we cannot simply measure the average response time in each situation because subjects vary systematically in how long they think and subjects who tend to think for longer might be more likely to face certain situations. Thus, we leverage the repeated observations of response times to separate the component of response times that is attributable to the situation from the component of response times that is due to systematic differences in thinking times between subjects. We do this by running the following fixed-effects regression for subject i's response time in seconds in round r:
where D k i,r is an indicator for subject i being in situation k in round r, α i is a subject fixed effect that absorbs systematic between-subject difference in response times, τ r is a round fixed effect that 13 These eleven situations represent all feasible situations with two exceptions: the situation where n < n o < n o and the subject earned three dollars (the subject tied with the opponent who chose n o ); and the situation where n o < n < n o and the subject earned three dollars (again the subject tied with the opponent who chose n o ). We omit these two situations because we have only four subject-round observations from each of the two situations, giving eight omitted observations. Subtracting these eight observations from the 7,020 subject-round observations from the second round onward gives our total of 7,012. We cannot use the 780 response-time observations from the first round since we categorize situations according to the characteristics of play in the previous round.
captures any trends in response times over the experiment (round five is the reference category), and ε i,r is an error term.
When estimating (1), one situation is arbitrarily chosen to be the reference category (k = 1; θ 1 = 0), and the parameter θ k then measures the pure effect on response time of being faced with situation k instead of this reference situation. Using estimates from the fixed-effects regression described in (1), we calculate the strategic complexity of situation k as follows:
whereθ k denotes the estimate of θ k andα i is the average of the estimates of the subject fixed effects. The third column of Table 2 reveals that strategic complexity, measured by average thinking time as detailed in (2), varies substantially across the eleven situations. The most complex situation is where the subject won the entire prize of six dollars in the previous round with a choice that was between that of her opponents; in this situation subjects think for an average of thirty seconds. The least complex situation is where the group was at the Nash equilibrium in the previous round (that is, all three group members chose zero); in this situation subjects think for an average of fifteen seconds. The variation in strategic complexity across situations is statistically significant: the null hypothesis that strategic complexity is constant across the eleven situations is strongly rejected (an F-test returns p = 0.000).
Situation
Subject-round Strategic Complexity observations (Average response time in seconds) n = n o = n o = 0 (∴ subject earned $2) 318 15.398 n o < n o < n (∴ subject earned $0) 1,739 25.249 n o = n o < n (∴ subject earned $0) 273 25.426 n < n o < n o & subject earned $0 633 26.064 n o < n < n o & subject earned $0 1,102 26.373 n = n o = n o > 0 (∴ subject earned $2) 123 26.680 n o < n = n o (∴ subject earned $0) 362 26.775 n < n o = n o (∴ subject earned $6) 181 27.027 n < n o < n o & subject earned $6 1,102 27.984 n = n o < n o (∴ subject earned $3) 546 28.447 n o < n < n o & subject earned $6 633 30.284
Notes: n denotes the number chosen by the subject in the previous round, and n o and n o denote the numbers chosen in the previous round by the subject's opponents (with n o ≤ n o ). Earnings refer to the subject's earning in the previous round. We have a total of 7,012 subject-round observations across the eleven situations (see footnote 13). The third column reports strategic complexity as described in (2). 
Heterogeneity
We now study whether subjects vary in how they adjust thinking time in response to changes in strategic complexity. We postulate that some subjects may be sensitive to changes in strategic complexity and choose to devote more time to thinking in more complex situations. Other subjects may not tailor their thinking time to the complexity of their situation, either because they fail to recognize that situations vary in complexity or because they lack the self-control needed to think for longer.
We explore the empirical support for this reasoning by estimating the following two-type mixture regression model, which captures heterogeneity in how thinking time responds to changes in strategic complexity:
ResponseTime i,r = β i StrategicComplexity i,r + υ r + σ i i,r for r = 2, ..., 10,
where
denotes the strategic complexity of the situation facing subject i in round r, X i,r denotes X i,r expressed in deviation form (i.e., differenced relative to the average of X i,r for subject i), υ r is a round fixed effect, and i,r is an independent error term with a standard normal distribution (see Section 4.2, and in particular (1) and (2), for the definitions of StrategicComplexity k and D k i,r ). The parameter β i describes how the subject's response time changes when strategic complexity deviates from the average strategic complexity faced by the subject, and σ i measures the standard deviation of the component of the subject's response time that is unresponsive to changes in strategic complexity. We distinguish two types of subjects: type 1 subjects have [β i , σ i ] = [β 1 , σ 1 ] and type 2 subjects have [
The probability of a subject being of type j is π j for j = 1, 2. Table 3 reports the parameter estimates for this two-type mixture regression model. We find that the thinking times of the two types respond very differently to changes in strategic complexity. Around sixty percent of subjects are type-1 subjects who increase thinking time substantially when strategic complexity increases (specifically, when the strategic complexity of the situation increases by one second, the response time of type-1 subjects increases by around 1.3 seconds). In contrast, type-2 subjects, who make up around forty percent of the subject population, hardly respond at all to changes in the complexity of their situation: the estimated effect size for type-2 subjects is around one-eighth of that for type-1 subjects. Notes: Parameter estimates were obtained by applying Maximum Likelihood estimation to the sample of 7,012 subject-round observations described in Table 2 . Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors with clustering at the group level are shown in parentheses. * , * * and * * * denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels (two-sided tests for β and one-sided tests elsewhere). Table 2 shows that the complexity of the situation in which a subject's group played the Nash equilibrium in the previous round (the 'equilibrium' situation) is substantially lower than that of the other ten situations (the 'non-equilibrium' situations). In Online Appendix II we show that our results on strategic complexity are not driven by differences between the behavior of subjects in the equilibrium situation and subjects in the non-equilibrium situations. In particular, Table SWA .2 shows that our estimates of the complexities of the ten non-equilibrium situations reported in Table 2 are essentially unchanged if we re-estimate these complexities using a sample that excludes the 318 subject-round observations where the subject's group played the equilibrium in the previous round. The notes to Table SWA.2 also report statistically significant variation in strategic complexity across the ten nonequilibrium situations. Tables SWA.3 and SWA.4 show that our results on the heterogeneous effect of strategic complexity on thinking time reported in Section 4.3 are robust to: (i) excluding the 318 subject-round observations where the subject's group played the equilibrium in the previous round; and (ii) including three types in the mixture regression model.
Robustness of results on strategic complexity

The value of thinking more
In Section 4 we categorized eleven situations according to the characteristics of play in the previous round and we measured the strategic complexity of a situation by how long subjects think on average when they face that particular situation. In Section 3 we showed that subjects who think for longer on average (across situations and rounds) are more successful. However, this between-subject correlation between average response time and average performance might be driven by the effect of unobserved individual characteristics on both response times and performance. We now turn to a more subtle question: is a subject more successful when she thinks for longer than she would normally do in a particular situation?
Estimation strategy and results
We explore whether a subject is more successful when she thinks for longer than she would normally do in a particular situation by exploiting within-subject variation in response times across rounds that is not attributable to variation in the strategic complexity of the situation facing the subject. We often observe the same subject facing the same situation more than once, and we can measure whether thinking for longer or for less long than the subject would normally do in that situation affects the subject's success.
We consider three measures of subject i's success in round r: being a winner of the round; earnings in the round; and the log of earnings in the round. Specifically, for each measure of success we run the following fixed-effects regression, which describes how a subject's success in a particular round depends on her thinking time in that round:
Success i,r = λResponseTime i,r + η i,s + γ r + e i,r , for r = 2, ..., 10,
where η i,s is a subject-situation fixed effect, γ r is a round fixed effect and e i,r is an error term. The subject-situation fixed effects absorb subject-specific systematic differences in success across situations. In particular, they absorb the effect of systematic differences in thinking times across situations at the subject level that are correlated with the subject's success. The parameter λ is thus identified from within-subject variation in response times across rounds in which the subject faced the same situation. It follows that we can interpret our estimate of λ as the effect of a subject thinking for longer than she ordinarily does in a particular situation (and −λ as the effect of thinking for less long than normal). The top panel in Table 4 reports parameter estimates from the fixed-effects regression described in (5). The table shows that thinking for longer than normal results in worse performance. In particular, when a subject thinks for one minute longer than she would normally do in a particular situation, the probability that the subject wins the round decreases by almost six percentage points. This translates into a reduction in earnings in the round of around twenty-seven cents or thirteen percent. We conclude that 'overthinking' is detrimental to success in our strategic setting.
We explore the behavioral mechanism that drives the detrimental effect of overthinking on performance by running fixed-effects regressions as described by (5), but with dependent variables based on the subject's choice in the round. The behavioral mechanism that drives the reduction in performance is a tendency to move away from Nash equilibrium behavior: the bottom panel of Table 4 shows that overthinking makes the subject more likely to increase her choice relative to her choice in the previous round and less likely to choose the equilibrium action of zero. In more detail, when a subject thinks for one minute longer than normal, the probability that her choice increases relative to the previous round goes up by six percentage points and the probability that she chooses the equilibrium action falls by three percentage points. Thinking more than normal also increases the subject's choice in the round, but this effect is noisy and therefore insignificant. Notes: We start with the sample of 7,012 subject-round observations described in Table 2 . From this sample, we then use the subject-round observations for which the subject is observed in the same situation in at least one other round (this ensures that subject-round observations are not fully absorbed by the fixed effects). This gives us 4,774 subject-round observations and 1,763 subject-situation fixed effects. A subject is considered to be a winner if she won all or part of the prize. When taking the log of earnings, we add fifty cents to earnings in each round (the show-up fee of five dollars divided by the number of rounds) to avoid taking the log of zero. 'Choose zero in round' is an indicator for the subject having chosen the equilibrium action of zero. 'Increased choice in round' is an indicator for the subject's choice in the round being greater than her choice in the previous round. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors with clustering at the group level are shown in parentheses. * , * * and * * * denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels (two-sided tests). Table 4 : Effect of thinking for longer than normal on success and strategic behavior
Robustness of results on the value of thinking more
A potential concern is that our results could be biased in the presence of a relationship between thinking time and experience. For example, subjects who have little experience of a situation might also think for longer and perform worse. We address this concern by showing that our results are robust to including controls for the subject's experience of her current situation: see Table SWA .5 in Online Appendix II.
Even though we have included round fixed effects that control for trends over rounds, a second potential concern is that our results could be biased in the presence of heterogeneous round trends. For example, some subjects might exhibit declining response times and improving performance over rounds, while other subjects might exhibit constant or increasing response times and worsening performance over rounds. We address this concern by showing that our results are robust to including controls for heterogeneous round trends: see Table SWA .6 in Online Appendix II.
In Section 4.4 we showed that our results on strategic complexity are not driven by differences between behavior in the equilibrium situation (that is, after the subject's group played equilibrium in the previous round) and behavior in the ten non-equilibrium situations. Table SWA.7 in Online Appendix II show that our results on the effects of thinking for longer than normal are also robust to excluding the equilibrium situation.
Conclusion
Response times in games allow researchers to gain insight into subjects' reasoning processes that choices alone cannot (Rubinstein, 2016) . We use experimental data on response times from repeated games to develop a measure of the strategic complexity of a situation based on how long subjects think on average when they face that situation, where situations are defined according to the characteristics of play in the previous round. Our finding that strategic complexity varies significantly across situations provides evidence that subjects respond to the characteristics of the situation that they face when deciding how much cognitive effort to allocate to the situation. But not all subjects do this: one type of subject responds strongly to strategic complexity, while another type hardly responds at all.
We also leverage our response-time data from repeated strategic interactions to show that when subjects think for longer than they would normally do in a particular situation, they perform less well. This finding suggests that allocating too many cognitive resources in games can be counterproductive: instead, quicker more instinctive responses can be more successful.
A nascent theoretical literature attempts to model how agents allocate cognitive resources in strategic situations (e.g., Alaoui and Penta, 2016b) . Our experimental results suggest that the willingness to engage in strategic reasoning varies systematically with the characteristics of the strategic situation that agents face. We hope that our findings will help to improve the predictive power of existing models of boundedly-rational thinking in games while also inspiring new empirically-grounded models that incorporate explicitly the choice of how hard to think in strategic interactions.
all participants in the room or was in the bottom half of the test scores of all participants. [30 second pause] [Example (not read aloud): Your test score was in the top half of the test scores of all participants in the room.] At the end of the session you will find out your own test score.
I will now describe the second and final part of the session. This second part is made up of 10 rounds. You will be anonymously matched into groups of 3 participants. You will stay in the same group for all 10 rounds. In each round, you and your other 2 group members will separately choose a whole number between 0 and 100 (0, 100 or any whole number in between is allowed). The group member whose chosen number is closest to 70% of the average of all 3 chosen numbers will be paid $6 for that round and the other 2 group members will be paid nothing. If more than one group member chooses a number which is closest to 70% of the average of all 3 chosen numbers, the $6 will be split equally among the group members who chose the closest number or numbers. Your total payment will be the sum of your payments in each round together with your show-up fee of $5. In each round you will have 90 seconds to choose your number. If you choose your number early you will still have to wait until the end of the 90 seconds. The top right-hand corner of the screen will display the time remaining (in seconds). The screen will also include a reminder of the rules.
At the end of each round you will discover: (i) the numbers chosen by all your group members; (ii) the average of all 3 chosen numbers; (iii) what 70% of the average of all 3 chosen numbers was; and (iv) how much each group member will be paid for the round. Please raise your hand if you have any questions.
You will stay in the same group of 3 for all 10 rounds. Each group member has been randomly allocated a label, X, Y or Z. Your screen is now displaying your label and whether the test scores of the members of your group were in the top half or the bottom half of the test scores of all participants in the room. [60 second pause] [Example (not read aloud): You are group member Y. Your test score was in the top half of the test scores of all participants in the room. You have been matched with 2 participants (group member X and group member Z). Group member X was randomly selected from those whose test scores were also in the top half. Group member Z was randomly selected from those whose test scores were in the bottom half.] Please raise your hand if you have any questions. There will be no further opportunities for questions.
[10 rounds of beauty contest with feedback as described in Notes: All averages are taken at the subject level. The Raven test score and personality factors 1-3 have been standardized to have means of zero and standard deviations of one (Gill and Prowse, 2016 , describe the construction of the personality factors). Personality was measured for 270 of our 780 subjects. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors with clustering at the group level are shown in parentheses. * , * * and * * * denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels (two-sided tests). n o < n o < n (∴ subject earned $0) 1,739 25.092 n o = n o < n (∴ subject earned $0) 273 25.526 n < n o < n o & subject earned $0 633 26.028 n o < n < n o & subject earned $0 1,102 26.286 n = n o = n o > 0 (∴ subject earned $2) 123 26.295 n o < n = n o (∴ subject earned $0) 362 26.806 n < n o = n o (∴ subject earned $6) 181 27.333 n < n o < n o & subject earned $6 1,102 27.998 n = n o < n o (∴ subject earned $3) 546 28.277 n o < n < n o & subject earned $6 633 30.272
Notes: We start with the sample described in Table 2 . From this sample, we exclude the equilibrium situation: that is, we exclude the 318 subject-round observations where the subject's group played equilibrium in the previous round. This gives us a total of 6,694 subject-round observations across the ten non-equilibrium situations. The third column reports strategic complexity as described in (2). See the notes to Table 2 for notational definitions. The null hypothesis that strategic complexity is constant across the ten non-equilibrium situations is strongly rejected (an F-test returns p = 0.001). Notes: Parameter estimates were obtained by applying Maximum Likelihood estimation to the sample of 6,694 subject-round observations described in Table SWA.2. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors with clustering at the group level are shown in parentheses. * , * * and * * * denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels (two-sided tests for β and one-sided tests elsewhere). Notes: Parameter estimates were obtained by applying Maximum Likelihood estimation to the sample of 7,012 subject-round observations described in Table 2 . Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors with clustering at the group level are shown in parentheses. * , * * and * * * denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels (two-sided tests for β and one-sided tests elsewhere). Notes: We run the same regressions on the same sample as in Table 4 , adding controls for the subject's experience of her current situation by including the indicator functions 1 {k} (χi,r) for k = 1, ..., 6, where χi,r ∈ {0, 1, ..., 6} is equal to the number of times that subject i experienced her current situation prior to round r (zero experience is the omitted category). No subject experienced her current situation in eight previous rounds (the maximum). One subject experienced her current situation in seven previous rounds: we set χi,r equal to six for this observation to ensure that the observation continues to contribute to the estimation. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors with clustering at the group level are shown in parentheses. * , * * and * * * denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels (two-sided tests). Notes: We run the same regressions on the same sample as in Table 4 , controling for heterogeneous round trends by including a separate linear round trend for each of the 780 subjects in the sample (formally, we augment (5) by adding the term ρi × r and treat ρi for i = 1, ..., 780, as parameters to be estimated). Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors with clustering at the group level are shown in parentheses. * , * * and * * * denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels (two-sided tests). Notes: We start with the sample of 6,694 subject-round observations described in Table SWA. 2. From this sample, we then use the subject-round observations for which the subject is observed in the same situation in at least one other round (as explained in the notes to Table 4 , this procedure ensures that subject-round observations are not fully absorbed by the fixed effects). This gives us 4,510 subject-round observations and 1,682 subject-situation fixed effects. We then run the same regressions as in Table 4 . Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors with clustering at the group level are shown in parentheses. * , * * and * * * denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels (two-sided tests). 
